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Abstract: 
This paper compares the decentralisation of Danish and Australian systems of industrial 
relations in recent decades. Despite significant differences in historical starting points and 
trajectories, that reflect different political economies, both Denmark and Australia have made 
the transition from a largely centralised to a more decentralised system. However, there are 
important differences in the means by which these developments occurred and the extent to 
which the basic character of industrial relations has changed in each country. The Australian 
system has placed greater emphasis than the Danish on a legalistic approach to labour 
market regulation and the enforceability of employment contracts. The Danish system has 
retained much of its voluntaristic social partnership approach, subject to a complicated 
interplay between collective agreements and legislation as well as EU regulations. The 
paper examines the degree to which the changes in each country are examples of ‘path 
dependency’, in so far as they are the products of historical legacies. It also examines 
disruptions which have occurred in each system which may explain the different trajectories 
of decentralised bargaining in Denmark and Australia. 
 
1. Introduction 
Both Denmark and Australia have made a transition from a largely centralised system of 
industrial relations to a more decentralised one in recent decades. However, there are 
important differences in means by which these developments occurred and the extent to 
which the basic character of industrial relations has changed in each country. Furthermore, 
the nature of the earlier centralised industrial relations systems in Denmark and Australia 
were configured differently and there remain strong influences from the past on recent 
developments. 
It should be noted that Denmark and Australia are not isolated examples of decentralisation 
among advanced market economies. Trends towards more decentralised forms of industrial 
relations has occurred among a number of countries, which were formerly more centralised, 
have been evident for some time. During the early 1990s, Katz (1993) reported a shift 
towards decentralised bargaining in six countries which he argued was initiated mainly by 
employers against the opposition of central union organisations. Katz and Darbishire (2000) 
later noted that there was increasing convergence across countries while at the same time 
there was increasing diversity within countries, which they described as ‘converging 
divergences’. They  also commented that, despite evidence of divergence, ’the persistence 
of sizable country differences in the relative mix of employment patterns, and the role that 
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national level institutions play in shaping that mix, suggests a continuing influential role for 
national employment-related institutions’ (Katz and Darbishire 2000:281) 
European systems of industrial relations have tried a variety of different approaches to 
decentralisation of collective bargaining in recent decades. Since the global recession in the 
late 2000s, the European Union has advocated the decentralisation of bargaining over wage 
setting and working conditions on the premise that greater workplace flexibility will 
promote job creation (Keune, 2015). In some countries which have been experiencing 
economic hardship, such as Greece and Spain, governments have intervened to exercise 
greater controls over both the process and outcomes of wage determination (Eurofound, 
2015). By contrast, the Nordic countries have maintained a more voluntaristic, agreement 
based approach to collective bargaining, although they have also introduced more company 
level bargaining within a centralised framework (Campos Lima and Jorgensen, 2016).  
Traxler (1995) highlighted the variety of forms which decentralised bargaining can take by 
distinguishing between ‘organised’ and ‘disorganised’ decentralisation. Organised 
decentralisation refers to the close engagement of unions in sector-level framework 
agreements. Disorganised decentralisation involves single employer bargaining in which 
unions are less influential due to their declining density. However, Traxler (1995) also noted 
that company level bargaining can take place within the context of a broader industry or 
national framework – as in the case of Denmark which has a well established voluntary 
social partnership between unions and employers. 
The Danish ‘negotiated economy’ model, with its limited industrial relations legislation, 
emphasised social dialogue and coordination between employers and unions, supported by 
the state, in order to reform the collective bargaining framework (Due et al. 1994, Madsen 
et al. 2016). By contrast, the approach to industrial relations in Australia has been based on 
a legal system that structures the relationships between the parties and frames the level, 
extent and outcomes of their interactions according to well-defined legislative boundaries. 
The ‘centralised’ systems in each country gave way to divergent ‘decentralised’ systems 
that, while both promoting greater flexibility, did so in different ways.  
In Denmark, the path to decentralisation was through continuing negotiated outcomes 
between the employers’ associations and trade unions. In keeping with the history of state 
intervention in Australia, decentralisation was pursued not via ‘deregulation’, as in many 
other liberal market economies, but through ‘reregulation’, which involved the 
reconfiguration of the legal framework to emphasise individual rather than collective 
employment rights. This reflects what Howell and Kolins Givan (2011:232) identified as ‘a 
process of deep-seated and wide-ranging institutional change [that is] underway in the 
political economies of advanced capitalism’. However, as they acknowledged with regard to 
the British, French and Swedish comparisons, while decentralisation represented a 
convergent outcome, ‘institutional convergence’ did not necessarily follow. Indeed the 
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‘different starting points and inherited institutional sets have meant that each country [has] 
moved along somewhat different patterns….’ (Howell and Kolins Givan 2011:250). 
2. Path dependency and the various forms of institutional change  
The aim of the paper is to analyse and discuss why Australia and Denmark have followed 
quite different pathways in introducing decentralised collective bargaining. The puzzle here 
being that at a first glance we see a parallel move towards decentralized bargaining. 
However, scrutinizing the change in the two bargaining systems reveals significant 
differences in the way this decentralization has been implemented, indicating that existing 
institutional structures matters. Encouraged by Teague (2009) we take up the concept of 
path dependency in order to compare the development of decentralized bargaining in 
Australia and Denmark.   
Paul Teague argues that we find both a strong and a milder version of path dependency. The 
strong one seeing institutions as deeply embedded with inbuilt self-reinforcing mechanisms 
and accordingly difficult to change. Potential impetus to change will typically be exogenous. 
In the milder version the importance of the past is emphasized, however, it allows for 
recalibration meaning first and foremost that the role of agency, the various actors, is 
highlighted (Crouch and Farrall 2004). Via mindful action the actors can pave the way for a 
new path thereby emphasizing that change can be endogenous. Thus stressing that there is 
a room for policy choice, where actors can shape and reshape the institutional landscape, 
still, new or re-formulated paths tend to build upon features of the old path. Teague 
concludes that the milder or softer version of path dependency is the more satisfactory 
framework to assess industrial relations activity over time. The strong version simply 
becomes too rigid (Teague 2009). 
Teague points to different trends in the literature illustrating this softer form of path 
dependency. A few should be mentioned here: Hybridization where institutions are 
reformed to perform different tasks or to carry out particular tasks in different ways while 
the overall characteristics of the institutions remain intact (Boyer et al. 1998). However, 
step-by-step changes might also lead to fragmentation meaning that established 
institutional arrangements either loose functionality or become disorganized meaning that 
basic elements of the institution wither away. This suggest that even though gradual 
changes seem to evolve within existing characteristics of the institution, it might lead to a 
tipping point setting of a transformation of the institution (Gladwell 2002). The robustness 
of a given institution can be analyzed with regard to the strength of various forms of 
institutional lock-ins. First, the functional lock-in referring to the effectiveness of institutions 
in carrying out tasks they were put in place to do. Second, the cognitive lock-in which cover 
rules, conventions and norms embodying actions of individuals, and thereby expressing 
what is acceptable versus unacceptable actions. Third, the political lock-in telling how 
committed the state or other social forces are to preserve traditional institutional structures 
(Grabher 1993).  
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In collaboration with different colleagues, Kathleen Thelen has emphasized the need to 
study incremental institutional changes, arguing that even minor changes over time might 
eventually lead to transformative change. Key-concepts developed regarding incremental 
change are displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion (Streeck and Thelen 
2004, Thelen 2009, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). These concepts are only rarely linked to 
path dependency, however, they are focused on institutional change as a subtle and not 
straight forward or rational process. Hereby emphasizing that existing institutional paths 
influence and matters in processes of change, or conversely; in social science we only rarely 
see a radical break away from the existing pathway.    
Based on these analytical inputs we seek to explain the divergent trajectories of 
decentralisation in Denmark and Australia. The paper begins by comparing some key 
characteristics of industrial relations in Denmark and Australia and how these have changed 
during the recent decades. The origins of the industrial relations systems in both countries 
are described and the divergent pathways which each has taken towards reform since the 
1980s. The next section contrasts the voluntarist approach to reform taken by Denmark 
with the greater reliance on legal regulation in Australia. This is followed by two sections 
about decentralized bargaining in the two countries; first focussing on the introduction of 
decentralized bargaining in the 1990s, second exploring examples of decentralized 
bargaining in manufacturing. Recent challenges to decentralized bargaining are analysed in 
the subsequent two sections. The paper concludes by comparing theoretical insights on 
decentralization of bargaining in the two countries and with observations about the degree 
to which the characteristics of industrial relations in each country reflect their historical 
origins and can be regarded as examples of path dependency, albeit with disruptions 
emerging from institutional evolution. 
3. Points of contrast: poIitical economy and industrial relations in Denmark and 
Australia 
While Denmark and Australia have both experienced a transition from largely centralized to 
a more decentralized systems of industrial relations in recent decades, there are differences 
in their respective political economies which have influenced the manner in which these 
changes have been introduced and their subsequent impact. Australia’s dependence on 
agriculture and mining means that it is more exposed to the volatility of resource markets 
and currency fluctuations. Denmark is integrated with the European Union and subject to 
EU regulations, which have implications for collective agreements and labour law. 
Denmark’s social security system is more extensive than Australia’s and is based on higher 
levels of taxation with greater levels of income equality. However, based on the so-called 
‘flexicurity’ policies Danish employers have rather far reaching discretion over their ability to 
dismiss employees while also having greater obligation to provide retraining for displaced 
employees. 
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Some of the key characteristics of industrial relations in Denmark and Australia, and how 
these have changed in recent decades, are shown in Table 1. Based on data gathered by 
Visser (in Thelen, 2014: 34-35) union density in Australia in 1970  is shown as being  
relatively high, with 44 per cent of the workforce being members of unions, compared with 
60 per cent in Denmark. By 2010, union density had – via an all-time peak in the mid 1990s - 
risen to 68 per cent in Denmark compared with a dramatic decline in Australia to 18 per 
cent. Collective bargaining coverage also increased during this period in Denmark from 60 to 
80 per cent, compared with a decline in Australia from a very high level of 90 per cent in 
1970 to only 45 per cent in 2010.  According to Visser, the trend towards decentralization of 
bargaining during this period was greater in Australia, where it shifted from being 
predominantly at the national level to that of the local or company level, while in Denmark 
it moved from the national to the sectoral or industry level. Finally, the degree of wage 
coordination in Denmark changed from economy-wide bargaining to a mixture of industry 
and economy wide bargaining with pattern setting. In Australia, wage coordination became 
more fragmented as company level bargaining became dominant replacing negotiations 
that previously had been located more at the industry level. Hence, while industrial 
relations in both countries became more decentralized between 1970 and 2010, the 
changes were more extreme in the case of Australia compared with Denmark. 
(insert Table 1 here) 
The classification of bargaining levels by Visser is somewhat oversimplified and underplays 
the ebb and flow between centralized and decentralized bargaining in Australia over many 
decades. While the enterprise bargaining principle was adopted by the parties in 1991, after 
an historic decision by the federal industrial relations tribunal, there were periods during 
the previous decades when some unions and employers broke away from the centralized 
system. This was particularly the case in the manufacturing industry, led by militant metal 
workers union, as well as in the airline industry, when the airline pilots opted for collective 
bargaining outside the centralized system. However, the parties later returned to the 
centralized system when economic and political circumstances changed. The 1980s was also 
a period when the system oscillated between centralized and decentralized bargaining. Both 
the two-tier wage system (1987-88) and award restructuring (1988-90) allowed enterprise 
bargaining to yield pace-setters, but the award system enabled wage gains to be spread to 
areas of the economy in which the bargaining power of unions was weak.  During the past 
decade, however, as the system has become more decentralized, bargaining has been 
focused more at the enterprise or company level and the ability of the national trade union 
confederation to coordinate wage bargaining across industries has declined. Nevertheless 
the national industrial relations tribunal still plays an important role albeit less than 
previously. 
4. The  Danish and Australian systems of industrial relations:  1890s to the 1980s 
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In order to establish whether there has been a degree of path dependency evident in recent 
industrial relations developments in Australia and Denmark, it is necessary to examine the 
origins and developments of each system, albeit briefly. The Danish and Australian systems 
of industrial relations both trace their origins to significant industrial disputes in the late 
nineteenth century. However, each country pursued different strategies to resolving 
industrial conflict and creating institutions to regulate relationships between employers and 
unions. The roles of the state and governments in industrial relations also differed markedly. 
In Denmark, there is a tradition of voluntarism with government leaving the unions and 
employers to bargain with little interference by the state. In Australia, by contrast, the 
government and state institutions have been deeply involved in regulating the relationship 
between employers and unions. The way in which the industrial relations systems have 
subsequently developed in each country provides evidence of the way in which their 
historical legacy persists through time. 
In Denmark, the institution of collective bargaining began with the ‘September compromise’ 
between the employers and trade unions in 1899 when employers and unions sought to 
resolve industrial conflict directly, without the involvement of the state or government. The 
first national agreement between the unions and employers at this time followed the 
resolution of a major lockout of workers by employers (Due et al., 1994).  A ‘de facto’ 
centralisation began when legal reforms required the parties to submit conciliation 
proposals to the Official Conciliator’s office and to conduct a ballot of parties involved in a 
dispute. The high point of centralisation occurred from the 1950s to late 1970s when the 
renewal of collective agreements was negotiated by the central organisations of unions and 
employers, the LO and the DA, conjunction with the State Conciliation Board on Labour 
Disputes.   
Due and Madsen (2008) have described Danish industrial relations as ‘a collective bargaining 
system characterised by voluntarism, in which the opposing parties themselves determine 
pay and working conditions. Further, the system is characterised by close interaction 
between the social partners and the political system, not only in terms of labour market 
policy, but also more broadly in the development of the ‘welfare society’. (Due and Madsen, 
2008). Various commentators have argued that the Danish model is a hybrid between a 
‘corporatist’ and a ‘pluralist/liberal’ industrial relations regime (see Campbell and Pedersen 
2007). The regulation of pay and working conditions through collective agreements is 
broadly in line with ‘liberal market’ principles while the link to the political system has a 
more corporatist character. 
The Australian system of industrial relations emerged when former colonial governments 
agreed to establish the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, but the new constitution gave 
the federal  government limited jurisdiction over the resolution of conflict between unions 
and employers, empowering them to make industrial laws only with respect to ‘conciliation 
and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of disputes extending beyond the limits of 
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any one State’ (section 51, paragraph 35). Accordingly, The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1904 (Cth) placed unions, as well as collective employer representatives alongside the state 
in the early regulatory architecture of industrial relations in Australia. For much of their 
post-federation history, unions enjoyed a privileged position as the establishment of the 
arbitration system explicitly sought to ‘facilitate and encourage the organization of 
representative bodies of employers and of employees and the submission of industrial 
disputes to the Court by [such] organizations’ (Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), 
Part 2.iv). The scope of federal powers over industrial relations and other matters gradually 
expanded, particularly after the Second World War. The strong emphasis on legalism and 
government intervention in industrial relations remained during the ensuing century, 
although many aspects of how regulation of relations between employers, employees and 
unions changed over time. 
Both the Danish and the Australian systems of industrial relations came under pressure in 
the 1980s. Enhanced international competition due to the opening of markets was a 
common challenge for both national systems. During the 1970s, the Danish economy was 
impacted by the oil crisis and severe economic imbalances, including high inflation and 
public debt. In this environment, employers and trade unions failed to reach agreement 
during several bargaining rounds. Consequently, the state intervened in the bargaining 
process. This created pressure on employers and trade unions to reform the bargaining 
system, in order to demonstrate that the industrial relation system, based on self-
regulation, was able to adapt and create solutions. At the same time, the dominant 
employers in manufacturing wanted to eliminate bargaining at the confederation level 
which, in their view, simply added to their costs. Instead, the employers wanted a clear- cut 
focus on sectoral and workplace level negotiations (Due et al. 1994).  
During the late 1980s and early 90s, both the unions and employers in Denmark reaffirmed 
their support for the collective bargaining system. In 1987, a joint declaration was made by 
the union and employer confederations, in concert with the centre-right government, 
whereby the trade unions agreed to wage restraint in order to safeguard jobs and improve 
the competiveness of Danish industry. For their part, the government agreed to support the 
introduction of an occupational pension scheme. This created the opportunity to ‘re-start’ 
the collective bargaining system. The main driver behind this development was the merger 
of various employers’ associations within manufacturing, leading to the formation of the 
Confederation of Danish Industries (DI) in 1992. DI is often referred to as the most powerful 
lobbying organization in Denmark. But DI became the key player on the employers’ side in 
collective bargaining and chose to maintain and reform the multi-employer bargaining 
system, despite the desire by some significant employers to implement a more radical 
decentralization. Danish trade unions continued to play a major role in the economy 
organising a clear majority of the workforce. Dismantling the national bargaining system 
would be no easy task. Hence, there continued to be strong support by both the Danish 
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employers’ associations and trade unions in retaining but reforming the system of multi-
employer bargaining (Madsen et al. 2016).  
The Australian industrial relations system came under pressure to reform during the 1980s 
when the economy became subject to greater external competition as tariff protection was 
reduced. The period of Labor government (1983-1996) marked both a high point of union 
influence over policy as well as a decline in union density. Although the government forged 
an ‘Accord’ with the unions on wages and prices, in order to deal with inflationary 
pressures, it also presided over a gradual decentralisation of the industrial relations system. 
In the late 1980s, enterprise level bargaining was introduced as the key instrument for 
regulating wages and conditions, with awards acting as safety net for those workers not 
covered by enterprise agreements (Wright & Lansbury, 2014). 
A different pattern of employer consolidation emerged in Australia, although somewhat 
earlier than in Denmark. In 1983, the influential Business Council of Australia (BCA) was 
formed with foundation membership of the CEOs from the largest 100 Australian businesses 
(Gailey 2008). Since then, both the BCA and the Australian Mining and Minerals Association 
(AMMA), have played a pivotal role not only directly lobbying for legislative changes but also 
in shaping the political agenda for regulatory change (Ellem 2015). During the 1980s and 
early 90s, the BCA successfully prosecuted the case for a dramatic move away from the 
centralised arbitration system towards enterprise level bargaining (Wright and Lansbury 
2014). The enterprise bargaining system, which was enacted and entrenched through 
legislation in subsequent years, did not seek to create a multi-level bargaining system. 
Rather, it limited collective bargaining activity to the workplace level. The capacity of unions 
to coordinate across an industry or sector was further constrained by laws limiting pattern 
bargaining (Thornthwaite and Sheldon 2012).  
The support from business and employer groups for enterprise bargaining is illustrative of a 
broader pattern in the evolution of Australian industrial relations in recent decades, namely 
the successful advocacy of reforms that enhanced managerial prerogative. The leadership of   
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) continued to promote enterprise bargaining, 
despite disaffection by some unions with the low growth in real wages delivered by the 
centralised system and the restrictions of the Accord (Wright and Lansbury 2014). This 
created a political environment in which the BCA and other employer associations gained 
confidence to set the agenda for industrial relations reform (Thornthwaite and Sheldon 
2012). 
However, one example of unions taking the initiative on reform, was the campaign for the 
expansion of the superannuation system in Australia, which is the labour market pension 
scheme. The union movement actively drove this development against the vigorous 
opposition of employers. In 1992, through the Accord with the Labor government, 
Australian workers became entitled to employer-funded superannuation, guaranteed 
through federal legislation (Neilson 2010). However, subsequent conservative coalition 
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governments have opposed expansion of compulsory employer contributions to 
superannuation. 
By contrast with the legislated approach taken in Australia, Danish occupational pension 
funds were established through collective bargaining. Under the 1987 declaration, the 
government agreed to support these schemes and, if necessary, pass legislation to bring 
them into being. However, as the DI changed its policy approach and embraced the idea of 
including the pension schemes in the collective agreements, these schemes remain based 
solely on collective agreements. As these developments happened during the early 1990s, 
they can be seen as part of the employers’ acceptance of the multi-employer bargaining 
system. These events also confirmed the ability and willingness of both unions and 
employers to develop the system of self-regulation, thereby also protecting the bargaining 
system against political intervention (Madsen et al. 2016).  
5. Decentralised bargaining in Denmark and Australia since the 1990s 
The amalgamation of manufacturing employers in Danish Industries (DI) marked a shift in 
the centre of gravity in collective bargaining from the national to sector level. The second 
part of the reform was to delegate bargaining rights to the parties at the enterprise level. 
However, national officers of both the unions and employer bodies forged general 
framework agreements within which sector and enterprise level negotiations occurred, 
thereby preserving overall coordination by the national unions and employer associations. 
This process of decentralisation has been described by Due and Madsen as ‘centralised 
decentralisation’ meaning that interest representation was centralised, such as 
manufacturing employers in DI, while bargaining competencies were decentralised although 
in a coordinated way (Due et al. 1994). Further, Due and Madsen have argued that the 
coordinated or controlled delegation of bargaining rights from sector level to enterprise 
level can be regarded as a system where the norms and values of the central system are 
retained through the decentralization process. Other observers called this form of 
decentralised bargaining ‘organised decentralisation’ (Traxler, 1995; Schulten, 2016). 
It is important to note that this process was not driven by legislation. It was all based on 
agreements between employers’ associations and the unions. The DI was the main driver of 
change. However, private sector trade unions in the LO revitalised an existing umbrella 
body,  the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark (CO-industri) in order to 
match the centralisation of employers’ interests within DI.   
The Danish system of centralised decentralisation can be illustrated with reference to 
negotiations on pay and the organisation of working hours. Collective bargaining over pay 
changed from being standardised agreements, with wages centrally determined, to various 
kinds of flexible pay systems negotiated at the enterprise level, as well as more individual 
pay negotiations. Since the mid 1990s, approximately 80 per cent of collective agreements 
include flexible pay systems (DA, 2014:192). Similarly, the organisation of working time may 
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be negotiated between management and shops stewards, thereby giving enterprises 
enhanced opportunities to introduce flexible working hours. To a large degree, this new 
flexibility was based on trade-offs in sector agreements, enabling trade unions to gain 
increased contributions for pensions, funding for further education and training, wage 
supplements during sickness and maternal/parental leave. Hence, ‘welfare issues’ 
increasingly have become part of the collective agreements (Madsen et al. 2016). 
The employers’ motivation for entering into these agreements was at least two-fold. First, it 
was the price they needed to pay in order to decentralise negotiations on pay and working 
time. Second, the Danish welfare state was evolving and the employers knew that one way 
or the other they would be involved in financing the further development of the welfare 
state. They preferred to do this via the bargaining process where they could exercise a 
direct influence on the scope and costs of new rights and benefits. It should be noted that 
employers in Denmark are not obliged to pay social contributions of the individual 
employment relationship. This contrasts with Germany and Sweden where employers are 
charged a social contribution per employee. This reflects the principle of self-regulation in 
the Danish system and the limited degree of state intervention.  
In Australia, the deregulation agenda of the Hawke-Keating Labor governments followed by 
the election in 1996 of the staunchly neoliberal conservative coalition government, saw the 
‘managed decentralism’ of the early 1980s give way to a more fragmented and 
decentralised system. The Workplace Relations Act 1996 marked a seismic shift in the 
regulation of industrial relations. For the first time since the nation’s federation, individual 
employment contracts were enshrined through a statutory instrument: Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs). 
A key feature of this period of conservative government was the active role of the state and 
the legislative intervention to make the bargaining system and the labour market more 
flexible. Employers had lobbied hard for greater managerial control during the preceding 
decade of Labor government and supported the Coalition government’s aim to eliminate 
perceived monopoly control of collective bargaining by unions. However, it was neo-liberal 
ideology that drove the government towards ‘re-regulation’ in order to reorient the 
bargaining system away from its centralised, collectivised foundations (Cooper and Ellem 
2008).  
The radical set of changes introduced by the conservative coalition government, from the 
late 1990s to the mid 2000s, included a change in the constitutional foundation of federal 
industrial relations legislation by bringing it under the corporations power of the 
Constitution. This allowed the federal government to directly set minimum terms and 
conditions of employment and reduced the role of the federal industrial relations tribunal. 
The government’s legislative reforms created a single national system of labour market 
regulation, introduced individual employment contracts, known as Australian Workplace 
Agreements  (AWAs), which could replace collective agreements. The government also 
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increased restrictions on union activities. However, reducing the protection from unfair 
dismissal of workers in businesses with fewer than 100 employees proved to be very 
unpopular and contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Coalition government in 2007. 
The incoming Labor government introduced industrial relations reforms. However, these did 
not represent a return to a centralised system, but simply curbed the more radical aspects 
of the changes imposed by the previous conservative coalition government. Specifically, the 
Labor government reinforced the authority of the federal industrial relations tribunal with 
regard to access for unfairly dismissed workers and collective bargaining was emphasised in 
the objects of the new Fair Work Act 2009. However, the ‘good faith bargaining provisions’ 
that were instituted, did not include any sanctions or compulsory arbitration triggers when 
bargaining between the parties reach an impasse. Active state involvement, through the 
federal workplace tribunal the Fair Work Commission (FWC) in workplace disputes is only 
available with the consent of both parties. Despite the Fair Work Act 2009 abolishing 
individual contracts, the Act conforms to the trend of favouring ‘individual employment 
rights and rule making processes’ over ‘collective rights and processes. Indeed, 
paradoxically, the Fair Work Act’s emphasis on collective agreement-making seems to 
support the individualisation of rule-making’ (Bray and Stewart 2013:41) as it grants 
individuals the right to appoint ‘bargaining agents’ during the collective bargaining process.  
Arguably, even under the Labor government, the decentralisation trend persisted as union 
density continued to fall.  
In 2013, a conservative Liberal National Party coalition government was elected promising 
‘minimal changes’ to industrial relations legislation but established a number of inquiries 
aimed at further reducing union influence.  Without a resurgence of union membership, it is 
unlikely that collective bargaining will expand and the trend towards greater 
individualisation of the employment relationship is likely to continue, regardless of which 
major political party is in government. 
6. Decentralised Bargaining in Manufacturing: Examples from Denmark and Australia 
A comparison of the shift towards decentralised bargaining in manufacturing provides a 
useful illustration of how the voluntaristic framework in Denmark involved a different set of 
processes and outcomes from the more legalistic model approach in Australia. As noted 
previously, the trend towards greater decentralisation of collective bargaining occurred in 
both countries during the latter part of the 1980s but proceeded in different ways. While 
manufacturing currently plays a much greater role in Denmark than Australia, the sector has 
provided a traditional benchmark for wage setting with active bargaining by unions and 
employers in both countries.  
In Denmark, manufacturing accounts for 16 per cent of GDP and employs about 16 per cent 
of the workforce, the majority of whom are highly unionised. The two central employer and 
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union bodies, Danish Industries and CO-industry respectively, negotiate a national industrial 
agreement which sets minimum wages for the manufacturing sector. However, there has 
been a long tradition of local wage bargaining at the company-level which occurs on an 
annual basis and comprises about half of the actual wages received by workers. Yet, in 
recent decades, the scope of company-level bargaining has expanded to a broader agenda, 
including working hours. More than 80 per cent of manufacturing companies covered by the 
industry-wide agreement also negotiate company-level agreements on both wages and 
working hours (Ilsoe, 2012). Negotiations of collective agreements at the company-level are 
usually led by local shop stewards but the workers have a de-facto right of veto over 
anything in the agreement which they do not accept. There is no provision for legal 
industrial action during company-level bargaining and while wild cat strikes can occur, they 
nevertheless have decreased during the past two decades (Ilsoe, 2012). 
In Australia, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP has declined over the past 25 years 
from 14 per cent to around 6 per cent. Its share of employment is now only about 7 per cent 
and the proportion of unionised workers across the whole economy has fallen to less than 
15 per cent. Nevertheless, historically, the Metal Industry Award set the benchmark for 
wages and conditions across the economy. The Australian Manufacturers Workers Union 
(AMWU), negotiated this award with the manufacturing employers association (now the 
Australian Industry Group), and this was one of the most important industrial relations 
agreements affecting the national economy. There also existed ‘over award’ agreements, 
negotiated at the company level, with larger and more profitable companies paying more 
than the smaller and less profitable ones. However, with the introduction of enterprise 
bargaining from the early 1990s, as well as the decline in the manufacturing industry, the 
Metal Industry Award declined in significance.  An important difference from Denmark was 
that changes in the Australian system towards more decentralised bargaining were 
incorporated in new industrial relations laws rather than voluntarily agreed between the 
unions and employers. 
The automotive manufacturing industry provides a useful example of the rather complex 
manner in which decentralised bargaining system was introduced in Australia with a high 
degree of involvement by government using the legal system. The industry played a major 
role in the Australian economy until recently when the last three major vehicle assemblers 
(GM Holden, Ford and Toyota) decided to close their manufacturing operations. The 
workforce employed by the auto manufacturers were highly unionised and there was an 
industry wide approach to negotiating wages and conditions. More than a decade after the 
introduction of an enterprise-based bargaining approach in the early 1990s, there were 
minimal differences between the enterprise agreements of each of the major companies 
and the unions (Lansbury et.al. 2006). However, the Liberal National Coalition government 
threatened to end various forms of economic support to the industry unless the employers 
and unions adopted a more differentiated approach to their enterprise agreements. The 
government also made it illegal for the parties to engage in ‘pattern bargaining’ with the 
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unions. Ultimately all of the major vehicle manufacturers closed their operations in Australia 
for a range of economic and market related reasons, including the ending of tariff 
protection by the federal government and the complexities of the industrial relations 
system (Wright and Lansbury, 2016). 
Case studies undertaken of decentralised bargaining in two similar manufacturing 
companies in Denmark and Australia by Ilsoe et.al. (2017) revealed different outcomes 
based on the negotiation process adopted by management and the unions. In the Danish 
case, the voluntaristic, agreement-based approach resulted in a stronger collaborative 
partnership between management and their employees than the more regulated, legalistic 
process used in the Australian case. The authors of the study emphasized the importance of 
Danish social partners having greater autonomy over the  bargaining process and its 
outcomes compared with the Australian case where a third party (the industrial relations 
tribunal) determined not only the process of negotiations but also whether the outcomes 
meet legislated requirements. Visser (2016) has described the Danish approach as an 
example of “articulated decentralisation” in which bargaining occurs at both industry and 
local level with controlled flexibility between these two levels. The more legislatively-bound 
Australian system requires the parties to ensure that both the process and outcomes of 
their enterprise based bargaining adhere to external formal requirements. The outcomes of 
the Danish approach appeared to produce a stable bargaining relationship while the 
Australian approach resulted in a more fragile bargaining outcome with a weaker 
relationship between management and their workforce. 
7.   Challenges to further decentralisation of the Danish industrial relations system 
The Danish tradition of negotiated change coupled with the strong position of multi-
employer collective bargaining has conflicted with legislation of the European Union in 
different ways. First, since the European social dialogue gained traction during the 1990s, 
and led to a range of directives on working time, atypical work, information and 
consultation, etc. there has been a basic mismatch between the traditional Danish system of 
labour market regulation by collective agreements and EU labour law based on directives. 
Lengthy discussions between the European Commission and Danish authorities resulted in 
the establishment of a tripartite implementation committee. A two phase model was 
developed by the committee. It was agreed that the EU Directives would be implemented 
via collective agreements and then supplementary legislation would be introduced to 
ensure that wage earners not covered by collective agreements would be embraced by the 
requirements of the Directives. While developments in recent years have shown that the EU 
Directives did not undermine the Danish collective bargaining system, only a few new EU 
Directives have been adopted since the early 2000s (Madsen et.al. 2016). 
Further, the enlargement of the EU between 2004 and 2007 to include new states from 
Central and Eastern Europe, led Danish companies, especially in construction, to hire foreign 
subcontractors with lower labour costs who compete against Danish workers. Cases brought 
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before the European Court of Justice once again revealed the tensions between the Nordic 
bargaining systems and the EU legislation. The Laval case in Sweden eventually restricted 
trade union action against foreign companies and highlighted these tensions (Dølvik and 
Visser, 2009). The court ruled that the Latvian building company did not have to pay local 
level supplementary wages despite this being stipulated in collective agreements. Neither 
Denmark nor Sweden have a statutory system of minimum wages or legislation rendering 
collective agreements generally applicable. Therefore, it is left up to the trade unions to 
enforce rules and regulation of the collective agreements. This led to some discussion 
whether Denmark should introduce legislation which would ensure that collective 
agreements can be made generally applicable to foreign companies. Some elements within 
the trade union movement expressed support for such an initiative, as did  some smaller 
employers’ associations in construction and road transport. These employers experienced 
what they considered as unfair competition from abroad, and argued for the need to break 
away from the tradition of negotiation and introduce legislation. However, the dominant 
trade unions and employers’ association maintained their support for continuation of the 
existing system of voluntary regulation. 
A different form of pressure on bargaining autonomy originated from the negotiated and 
coordinated decentralisation of the bargaining system itself. The transfer of bargaining 
competences on key-issues, such as pay and the organisation of working time, to the 
company level, paved the way for welfare issues to be placed on the national sectoral 
bargaining agenda. There were at least two reasons for this. First, as mentioned earlier, the 
price the employers had to pay in order to gain this new flexibility involved, to a large 
degree, the inclusion of these welfare issues on the bargaining agenda. Furthermore, the 
outcomes of the national bargaining rounds have to be approved by trade union members 
in a general ballot.  This means that if pay increases are not part of these negotiations, 
welfare issues tended to be included in order to ensure the support of union members to 
the agreements. However, as soon as pension, further education and training and parental 
leave, became part of the bargaining agenda, this also became part of the political debate.   
Second politicians in Denmark felt impelled to influence the bargaining agenda as such 
issues are of general interest. However, social partner representatives argued that the 
bargaining autonomy was being questioned. Moreover, it has often been argued that access 
to such benefits and schemes should be a general right for all, not exclusively to those who 
are covered by a collective agreement. Eventually this led to the emergence of a kind of 
dual-regulation system where collective agreements are complemented by legislation, 
making sure that all employees are covered by the regulation (Due & Madsen 2008). To 
some degree, this system mirrors the implementation of EU Directives. More importantly, 
this development underlined the necessity of a well-functioning interplay between 
collective agreements and legislation or between the social partners and the government in 
office. In 2012 an ambitious attempt at tripartite negotiations failed completely. Yet, in early 
2016, the Conservative government invited the social partners to negotiate about initiatives 
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that could improve the integration of refugees into the labour market. This led to a 
successful agreement in the spring of 2016. Further tripartite negotiations are scheduled 
indicating that we might see recurring tripartite talks and negotiations in the years to come, 
potentially also handling tensions between the political system and the bargaining parties. 
All in all, despite these challenges, the continuing preference for voluntarism by the main 
actors in the Danish system provides a stark contrast to the legalism apparent in the 
Australian case and is suggestive of the path dependency operating in both industrial 
relations systems. As previously noted, industrial relations in Australia historically have been 
circumscribed by the peculiarities of the federal constitution, the resultant arbitration 
system and tribunals around which it centred. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 
(Cth) placed unions, as well as collective employer representatives alongside the state in the 
early regulatory architecture of industrial relations in Australia. Some have argued that the 
arbitration system itself shaped and to some extent, limited the capacity of unions to 
represent their members (Howard 1977).   
8. Challenges to further decentralisation of the Australia industrial relations system 
The changes initiated by the Liberal National Party coalition government between 1996 and 
2005, and embodied in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WRA) and subsequent 
amendments, were the focus of a concerted political campaign by the union movement 
which has been credited with influencing the election of the Rudd Labor government in 
2007 (Ellem 2013). Although Labor’s Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) abolished AWAs), it did 
not re-establish the authority of a federal arbitral tribunal. While one of the objectives of 
the FW Act was  ‘achieving productivity and fairness through an emphasis on enterprise-
level collective bargaining’ (Division 2, Section 3), other aspects of the legislation retained 
aspects of the WRA.  
Nevetheless, the Fair Work Act introduced a number of important changes, including: 
 an increased role for the federal government  regulating employment conditions in 
the private sector 
 establishment of a statutory safety net of conditions 
 enabled the federal tribunal to focus on individual rather than collective issues, 
including unfair termination and grievances (Stewart 2009).  
These characteristics, common to the WRA and the FW Act, reflect what Bray and Macneil 
(2011) identify as a trend in the legal regulation of employment, namely the embodiment of 
individual employment rights in statute in place of collective rights conferred on 
representative organisations. The granting of legal rights to individuals necessarily requires 
that they undertake legal action to enforce those rights. Hence, while it could be argued 
that the emphasis on the legal regulation of employment in Australia has been maintained, 
there have also been important changes in the nature of that legalism.  
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The shift to a more decentralized employment relations system in Australia has implications 
for collective representatives that were an integral part of the previous system. Employer 
associations have moved away from industrial advocacy to fee for service arrangements 
and, in some cases, towards a greater engagement with broader political and economic 
issues (Wright and Lansbury, 2016). During the 2007 election, in which the regulation of 
industrial relations was a key issue, two large employer bodies, the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (ACCI) and the BCA contributed funds to an advertising campaign 
against Labor and its industrial relations policy (Wright and Lansbury, 2016). 
Unions also have been forced to change. They no longer have a guaranteed role in 
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment and have had to reconsider their 
regulatory and political roles (Kaine and Brigden 2015). Despite their contribution to the 
2007 electoral success of the Labor party, the result did not herald a return to the type of 
relationship between union and the labor government that was seen during the Accord 
years, but rather a relationship marked by ‘influence not partnership’ (Wright and Lansbury 
2014). The nature of this relationship was evident in the form of the FW Act. While unions 
were successful in gaining the abolition of individual contracts there were other aspects of 
the Act that constrained their activities, including penalties for illegal industrial action and 
limits on the scope and content of enterprise bargaining (Wright and Lansbury 2014). 
As in Denmark, there are differences between Australian unions and the positions they 
adopt on various legislative and policy changes. Some unions have successfully lobbied for 
the protection of their members outside of the FW Act and also largely outside of the ACTU. 
For example, the Vehicle division of the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) 
proactively pursued government intervention in the failing Australian automotive industry 
and engaged with concession bargaining with automotive employers during the fallout of 
the global financial crisis to limit job losses (Wright and Lansbury 2014). The Australian 
Services Union successfully prosecuted an equal remuneration case in the social and 
community services sector and a decade long campaign by the Transport Workers Union 
resulted in the Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012. The last of these was particularly 
significant, albeit short-lived, as it marked one of the few union successes in legally 
regulating all participants in a supply chain not just the direct employers (Rawling and Kaine 
2012). This is reflective of various attempts by unions to grapple with the proliferation of 
non-standard employment relationships in Australia. What is also illustrated by these 
examples is the legacy of statist tradition of Australian industrial relations. Specifically, in 
attempting to represent and improve conditions for those workers who are not captured by 
traditional labour law, unions have still looked to the state to intervene.  Unions have 
sought to leverage the economic and regulatory power of the state, and not simply amend 
labour laws (Kaine and Wright 2013, Ravenswood and Kaine 2015).  
However, the extent to which the industrial relations system in Australia has become 
deregulated, with a diminished role for collective representation, should not be 
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exaggerated. Almost three quarters of the workforce in Australia have their wages and 
conditions set by collective enterprise agreements or awards. The Fair Work Commission 
remains an important labour market institution with considerable powers and authority 
over the labour market.  Collective enterprise agreements and awards still cover the 
majority of the workforce and collective regulation remains a significant influence on the 
Australian economy. There is strong public support for the role played by the Fair Work 
Commission in setting a national minimum wage. The Productivity Commission’s Report on 
the industrial relations system endorsed the importance of the Fair Work Commission in 
regulating the labour market and proposed no fundamental changes to the current system. 
The recent decision by the Fair Work Commission on changes to penalty rates demonstrated 
its continuing role in wage setting at the national level. 
9. The differing pathways to decentralisation: Australia and Denmark compared 
As shown the Danish industrial relations system is, to a large degree, based on self-
regulation by the social partners. Accordingly, the decentralisation of collective bargaining 
was implemented via dialogue and negotiations between employers and unions, even 
though it should be emphasised that the employers campaigned for this development. It 
can be argued that the Danish bargaining system was taken through a process of conversion 
as the system was redirected towards new functions and purposes, i.e. increased room for 
company level bargaining while also providing coordination between local and national level 
bargaining. Still importantly, the main characteristics of the bargaining system, including the 
wider industrial relations system, remained intact. Like in Denmark, the Australian 
employers initially were the main protagonists for the decentralisation of bargaining and the 
industrial relation system in general. However, the changes were implemented via 
legislative initiatives. Hence, while Denmark followed a negotiated approach between 
employers and unions, Australia adopted a more legalistic approach to changes. Further, the 
process of institutional change appears as quite different from what happened in Denmark.  
Company level bargaining was introduced from the early 1990s in a rather complex manner 
and with a high degree of involvement by government. A relatively large number of 
legislative initiatives have since then in various ways set the framework for collective 
bargaining, often deepening the process of decentralization, however, this has not 
happened in a unambiguously way. All in all this suggests a process of layering as new 
legislation opened possibilities for new forms of bargaining while existing structures still 
were in place although gradually becoming still more insignificant. On the other hand it is 
evident that some of the legislative initiatives were different. As emphasized above The 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 marked a seismic shift in the regulation of industrial relations 
as for the first time since the nation’s federation, individual employment contracts were 
enshrined through a statutory instrument: the Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). 
Later on the Liberal National Coalition government made it illegal to engage in ‘pattern 
bargaining’ with the unions in order to force employers and unions to adopt a more 
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differentiated approach to their enterprise agreements (Wright and Lansbury, 2016). These 
legal measures rather illustrate a process of displacement meaning a more abrupt break 
away from existing organizational forms and practices while new ones are introduced. 
Taken together these varying forms of change point to a fragmentation indicating that 
existing institutional arrangements had become disorganized and tended to wither away, 
while new and more diverse bargaining structures gradually were established.  
Furthermore, the Australian trajectory reveals the relative weakness of the different 
institutional lock-ins. Clearly, especially the political lock-in, meaning the willingness of the 
state – the governments in office – and other social forces to preserve existing institutional 
structures were fragile or even withering away. Rather liberal government were determined 
to break up the traditional bargaining system while the labor governments refrained from 
re-instating multi-employer bargaining. Contrary in the Danish case the political lock-in 
appears as robust as both center-left and center-right government over the years accepted 
the autonomy of bargaining system. An important precondition has been the ability of the 
bargaining parties to develop and reform the system ensuring a high level of coverage of the 
collective agreements. This emphasizes that the probably most important institutional lock-
in has been the functional lock-in in the sense that the employers’ belief in the efficiency of 
a reformed bargaining system were maintained over the years. From the employers’ point 
of view efficiency in this context first and foremost is about increasing productivity and 
competitiveness. At the same time, the strength of Danish trade unions has to be taken into 
consideration. The high rate of unionization, close to 70 per cent, tells that it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the employers to aim for a dismantling of the multi-employer 
bargaining system. Consequently, the employers’ chose via mind full actions to negotiate a 
reformed multi-employer bargaining system making the strategic choice to aim for a 
partnership with the dominant unions in manufacturing. Further, this confirmed their 
preferred strategy of maintaining the autonomous bargaining system vis-à-vis the political 
system. Thus, the employers intended to avoid political intervention in the regulation of 
wages and conditions.    
Decline of unionization – going down to around 15 per cent of the workforce (ABS 2017) – is 
probably a key-explanation for the quite different Australian trajectory. With the federal 
arbitral tribunal (variously named throughout the last century) having been responsible for 
settling industrial disputes, determining levels of wages in each industry and for different 
classes of work, particularly through periodic national wage cases, some Australian unions 
were ill-prepared for enterprise bargaining when it was first introduced in 1991 (Peetz 
2012). How much this contributed to the rapid decline in union membership witnessed in 
the 1990s is a point of contention, but the continued change in the legal framework away 
from its centralist foundations has continued to pose a challenge for a union movement 
including the low level of union density. 
Conclusions  
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This paper has examined the transition from centralised to a more decentralised bargaining 
in Denmark and Australia over recent decades. It has observed that while there are some 
similarities in the factors which caused these changes, there are important differences in 
the means by which decentralised bargaining was introduced with consequences for the 
industrial relations system in each country. The Danish system has retained much of its 
voluntaristic social partnership approach while the Australian system has tended to rely on a 
more legalistic approach to labour market regulation.  
The experience of each country reveals a degree of ‘path dependency’ insofar as the means 
by which the changes were introduced reflect the influence of historical legacies (see 
Teague, 2009).  The Australian system of industrial relations has always been strongly 
rooted in a legalistic approach. This dates back to the establishment of the federal 
arbitration tribunal in 1904 to settle industrial disputes and make awards to regulate wages 
and conditions of workers.  Although the powers of the tribunal have diminished, recent 
reforms have introduced new laws to regulate wages and conditions, even though the focus 
is more on individual rather than collective regulation. Furthermore, while the bargaining 
level has shifted from the national or sectoral level to the enterprise level, in keeping with a 
more decentralised system, the federal tribunal still plays an important role in setting 
minimum wages and awards.  There has also been an ebb and flow between centralised and 
decentralised approaches to wage bargaining in Australia and this is likely to continue. 
The introduction of a more decentralised bargaining approach in Denmark has also reflected 
traditional voluntaristic approach whereby the social partners seek to retain their 
independence from government interference. They Danish unions and employers have 
moved from a centralised approach to bargaining to a mixture of industry and company 
level bargaining. The social partners have also retained a relatively high degree of wage 
coordination. However, the autonomy of the Danish social partners in relation to bargaining 
has been challenged by EU regulation (including directive and rulings by the European Court 
of Justice). 
Hence, while the recent developments in Denmark and Australia reveal the strong influence 
of the past, there is no evidence of historical determinism.  In both countries, there is 
complex interaction between factors which foster a more decentralised approach to 
bargaining and remnants of the former centralised system which emphasize the role of the 
federal arbitral tribunal, in the case of Australia, and the influence of the relatively strong 
employer associations and trade unions, in the case of Denmark. There is also greater 
divergence between each country in terms of the way in which decentralised bargaining 
occurs. The examples drawn from the manufacturing industries in Denmark and Australia 
demonstrate how the voluntaristic, agreement based approach in Denmark produced a 
stronger collaborative partnership between management and their employees than the 
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Table 1. Key Indicators of Stability and Change in Industrial Relations: Australia and 
Denmark Compared 
 
Source: Jelle Visser (http://www.uva-aias.net/208). Quoted in: Thelen, K. (2014) Varieties of 
Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, p.34-35.  
Notes: 
1. Union Density is the net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary 
earners in employment. 
2. Bargaining (or union) coverage measures the proportion of employees covered by 
wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners with the 
right to bargain. 
3. Bargaining levels are summarised as follows:  
 5 = national or central level 
 4 = national or central level, with additional sectoral/local or company level 
 3 = sectoral or company level 
 2 = sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company level 
 1 = local or company level  
4. Degree of wage coordination is defined as follows: 
 5 = economy-wide bargaining 
 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining with pattern setting 
  Years Differences  
1970-2010   1970 2010 
Union Density1 Australia 44.2 18.0 -59% 
 Denmark 60.3 68.5 +14% 
Collective Bargaining 
Coverage2 
Australia 90 45 -50% 
 Denmark 80 85 +6% 
Bargaining Level3 Australia 4 1 -2 
 Denmark 5 3 -2 
Degree of Wage 
Coordination4 
Australia 3 2 -1 
 Denmark 5 4 -1 
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 3 = industry bargaining with no pattern of irregular pattern setting 
 2 = mixed industry and firm-level bargaining with weak enforceability of industry 
agreements 
 1 = none of the above, fragmented, mostly company level bargaining  
